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AWindow for Climate Action
Recent student-led (Fridays for Future) and climate change activist-initiated (Extinction Rebellion)
protests have effectively mobilized substantial resources and received extensive media coverage.
However, potentially due to differences in these movements’ tactics, it appears that Fridays for
Future has had a more positive impact in bringing attention to the issue of climate change. The
protests may have opened a policy window for climate change, presenting a momentary opportunity
for substantial political action.
Comment
After decades of remaining on the po-litical back burner, climate change
has emerged as a top priority for vot-
ers in 2019. Green parties received his-
torically high support in the 2019 Euro-
pean Parliamentary Elections, as well as
in federal elections in Austria, Belgium
and Switzerland. Climate change also
emerged as one of themost important po-
litical issues in federal elections in Aus-
tralia[1] and Canada[2].
Climate change was the most impor-
tant issue for voters in several Western
and Northern European states in the most
recent European Parliamentary elections
(Eurobarometer[3]). Like many of the
current political issues, concerns for cli-
mate change appear to be split amongst
generational lines – younger voters (45%
of <25 years old) were more likely than
older voters (34% of >55) to say that
combating climate change was an issue
motivating their vote. However, con-
cern for climate change is not universal
throughout Europe, but rather is viewed
as secondary to economic and labor is-
sues in Southern and Eastern European
states (fitting with historical pattern of
comparatively decreased environmental
concerns within these states[4]).
Recent increases in concerns for the
environment have also not been uniform
across Western European states. In Ger-
many, public opinion has rapidly shifted
in the past year, where the environment
is viewed as the most important problem
facing the country. Since 2000, rarely
more than 10% of Germans have viewed
the environment as an important prob-
lem (see Figure 1). Currently, recent sur-
vey data suggests that between 45%–60
% of Germans view the environment and
climate change as an important prob-
lem (Politbarometer[5]). Within the UK,
viewing the environment as an impor-
tant issue has also reached a record high,
but still remains a far second to concerns
over Brexit (Yougov[6]). While in the
United States, there appears to be mini-
mal changes in viewing the environment
as an issue (Gallup[7]). But what ap-
pears to be driving increased perceptions
of the environment as an important issue
in places like Germany, and why haven’t
we seen similar changes other locales,
such as the United States?
Climate change activism
Climate change activism has also taken
on a far more prominent public role in
2019. In particular, two large activist so-
cial movements have arisen, the student-
led Fridays For Future movements and
the activist-initiated Extinction Rebel-
lion. While both are advocating for sim-
ilar goals, namely rapid decarbonization
aimed at net zero emissions, they have
very different organizational forms and
strategies.
Fridays for Future, and related
student-led climate change activist
groups, are largely decentralized,
locally-based groups established around
the world, and are generally credited as
being sparked by Greta Thunberg. Thun-
berg is a Swedish teenager who, after be-
coming inspired by the student activist
1
survivors of Parkland High School, be-
gan protesting for climate change action
on the steps of Parliament in Stockholm
in August 2018. She has become a global
phenomenon in 2019, even being tipped
as a leading contender for the Nobel
Peach Prize[8]. Thunberg has largely
advocating for increased focus on cli-
mate change science and the necessity
for immediate coordinated action. In
general, the Fridays for Future move-
ment has adopted the tactic of weekly
student strikes, as well as frequent large-
scale coordinated marches, loosely or-
ganized around diverse calls for further
climate change actions. In 2019, there
have been three global climate strikes,
in March, May and September, with a
fourth planned for the end of November.
Extinction Rebellion, on the other
hand, was formed by a group of en-
vironmental activists and social move-
ment scholars based in the United King-
dom. The leaders of Extinction Re-
bellion have taken a much more pub-
licly aggressive activist approach, rou-
tinely staging large acts of civil disobe-
dience. Extinction Rebellion has orga-
nized a well publicized ‘die in’ at the
British Museum, as well as disruptive
acts such as achieving mass arrests and
blocking commuter trains. While ini-
tially based in the UK, Extinction Rebel-
lion is beginning to spread to actions in
other countries as well, notably with re-
cent high profile protests in Berlin.
The student-led climate protests
and Extinction Rebellion activists have
clearly taken different tactics in mobiliz-
ing their resources, and these approaches
may have resulted in different affects on
public opinion towards climate change.
Within Germany, the Fridays for Future
movement has been far more promi-
nent, as judged by coverage in national
prestige print media outlets (see Figure
2). Fridays for Future student protests
in Germany have received steadily in-
creased coverage since August 2018,
with roughly 15 times as many press
articles as Extinction Rebellion during
this time period. The media coverage of
Fridays for Future in Germany appears
to have spiked around each of the three
global climate strikes in 2019. Further,
there appears to be related increase in
Germans viewing the environment as
an important issue after each of these
strikes, suggesting that the Fridays for
Future movement may have supported,
or even triggered, this rapid shift in pub-
lic opinion.
Conversely, in the UK, Extinction
Rebellion has played a far greater public
role, receiving substantively more press
coverage than Fridays for Future. But,
the press coverage of Extinction Rebel-
lion has often been negative, or ques-
tioning of the specific adopted tactics[9],
presenting a limit to outreach of the
movement to the broader public. Further,
there also appears to be comparatively
less of a correlation between the Fridays
for Future global marches and viewing
the environment as an important issue in
the UK, rather the increased public opin-
ions appear to bemore gradual over time.
While in the US, neither Fridays for Fu-
ture or Extinction Rebellion have made
much of a public impact, either in terms
of media coverage or shifting views on
the environment as an issue.
Conversely, in the UK, Extinction
Rebellion has played a far greater public
role, receiving substantively more press
coverage than Fridays for Future. But,
the press coverage of Extinction Rebel-
lion has often been negative, or ques-
tioning of the specific adopted tactics[9],
presenting a limit to outreach of the
movement to the broader public. Further,
there also appears to be comparatively
less of a correlation between the Fridays
for Future global marches and viewing
the environment as an important issue in
the UK, rather the increased public opin-
ions appear to bemore gradual over time.
While in the US, neither Fridays for Fu-
ture or Extinction Rebellion have made
much of a public impact, either in terms
of media coverage or shifting views on
the environment as an issue.
This suggests that Fridays for Future
may present a more ideal model for mo-
tivating the broader public towards cli-
mate change. For social movements to
thrive over the long-term, new partici-
pants must replace older members. The
involvement of youth in suchmovements
(who may have the resource of greater
free time) is critical if they are to sur-
vive over time[10]. Further, such strate-
gies may be better at mobilizing poten-
tial resources[11], having the duel effect
of activating adherents in the existing en-
vironment movements as well as bring-
ing in latent bystanders, such as tradi-
tional labor organizations and members
of the broader public. Within the Ger-
man context, the decades-long environ-
mental movement appears have been ac-
tivated in support of the student protests,
along with other interest groups, such as
scientists[12] and labor groups[13].
Alternatively, non-normative protest
methods, such as those used by Extinc-
tion Rebellion, potentially decrease pop-
ular support because they can be per-
ceived as a violation of broader social
norms[14]. But, the non-violent meth-
ods adopted by Friday for Future, such
as rallies, strikes and marches, can in-
crease support and mobilization poten-
tial as they are perceived to be more
“efficacious” and “legitimate”[15]. As
such, the tactics adopted by the Fri-
days for Future movement has the poten-
tial to effectively motivate resources and
support from traditional environmental
sources, as well as expanding to other
non-traditional groups, all while avoid-
ing the alienation of the broader public
as their actions andmembers may be per-
ceived more positively and legitimate.
Opening the Policy Window for Cli-
mate Change Action
The increased media attention to the is-
sues of climate change combined with
the shift in public opinion dynamics
presents an opportunity to open a “pol-
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Figure 1: Percentages of adults that list the ”Environment as an Important Issue”. Panels (A), (B) and (C) present survey
data collected at least monthly since the beginning of the Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion protests in August 2018
until current from Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively. Dotted grey vertical lines display days of
global strikes organized by Fridays4Future in March, May and September 2019. Panel (D) presents survey data collected from
the longest periods available for each program. Data is collected by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: Politbarometer (Germany)[5],
YouGov (United Kingdom)[6] and Gallup (United States)[7]. The question wordings and survey methodologies are similar, but
are not identical. Therefore, direct interpretation of percentages between countries is cautioned against. Rather, comparisons
are better made within each country over time.
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Figure 2: Prestige print media coverage of Friday’s for Future and Extinction Rebellion in Germany, the United King-
dom and the United States. Panels (A), (B) and (C) display the number of articles per month appearing in domestic prestige
print media outlets that mention Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion, or their associated leadership figures, in Germany,
the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively. Panel (D) compares the total number of articles since August 2018 to
October 2019 that mention Fridays for Future or Extinction Rebellion in each of the three countries. The prestige print media
sources adopted for each country are: Germany (Der Spiegel, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die
Zeit), United Kingdom (The Guardian, The Independent, The Times and The Observer) and for the United States (The New
York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal and USA Today). Search terms utilized for Fridays for Future were
”Fridays for future”, ”FFF”, ”Greta Thunberg” ”school strike for climate”, ”youth for climate”, ”climate strike”, ”youth strike
for climate” in English-language publications, as well as including the terms ”Schulstreik für das Klima” OR ”Schulstreik”
OR ”Klimastreik” in German language publications. Search terms utilized for Extinction Rebellion articles were ”extinction
rebellion”, ”Roger Hallam” and ”Gail Bradbrook” for all English and German language publications.
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icy window”. Policy windows are op-
portunities for advocates to promote their
preferred policy instruments[16]. These
advocates, also known as “policy en-
trepreneurs,” often wait for political op-
portunities that can be used to their ad-
vantage. Political opportunities that can
open policy windows include changes in
political leadership or governing coali-
tions, or shifts in the national mood
which can be reflected in large-scale
changes in public opinion. However,
policy entrepreneurs must act quickly, as
these ephemeral windows of opportunity
happen infrequently and are usually only
open for a short period of time[16].
Further, political actors are consid-
ered to be responsive to shifting public
opinions[17]. Contemporary right-wing
populist parties are often seen as a poten-
tial hindrance to developing climate poli-
cies[18], but may not always be the case.
Some populist parties, such as the ‘Five
Star Movement’ in Italy, have adopted
progressive climate policy stances. That
is, populist parties are not inherently
opposed to climate change actions, but
frame their politics around what the pub-
lic considers to be popular, reflecting the
‘will’ of the people against the elites[19].
Further, due to climate change social
movements, new political coalitions can
be developed[20]. For example, sci-
entists recently became involved in the
student-led climate protests[21] (Schier-
meier et al. 2019). These shifts in pub-
lic opinion have the potential to punc-
tuate previously sticky institutions, such
as environmental regulatory regimes, re-
sulting in substantive policy shifts[22].
Lastly, negative economic condi-
tions have been noted as hindrances
to environmental policies, as they have
long been viewed as holding compet-
ing objectives with an oppositional trade-
off[23]. While the recovery from the
Great Recession has been neither com-
plete, nor uniformly experienced, The
US, UK and Western European states
have all experienced annual growth since
2010 (World Bank, 2019). Similarly,
the average unemployment rate in OECD
countries has dropped from the highpoint
of 8.3% in 2010 down to 5.3% in 2018,
including rates under 4% in Germany,
the US and the UK (OECD, 2019).
Given these shifting conditions, it
may finally be time to have some op-
timism about the future of public pol-
icy responses rising to meet the needs
of climate change mitigation. That is,
the climate policy window may be tem-
porarily opening. Germany, for exam-
ple, has recently introduced it’s first ever
federal climate change laws, mandating
that the country meet it’s 2030 goals
(a 55% reduction in GHG emissions)
as well as establishing pathways to pur-
sue carbon neutrality by 2050. Cur-
rently, only a limited set of countries
have enacted national climate change
laws, and Germany is by far the largest
and move diverse economy to propose
such actions. This presents the possi-
bility for policy diffusion and transfer
to other states[24], particularly consid-
ering the powerful role Germany plays
within the European Union. Climate pol-
icy entrepreneurs need to build upon this
momentum to further capitalize on this
window of opportunity, pushing climate
change proposals prominently into na-
tional and supra-national governmental
agendas before this ephemeral moment
passes.
5
References
[1] Adam Morton. “How Australia’s election will decide its role in climate change”. en. In: Nature (May 2019).
[2] Brian Owens. “Canadian election leaves scientists hanging — no matter who wins”. en. In: Nature (Oct. 2019).
[3] Eurobarometer. The 2019 Post-Electoral Survey: Have European Elections Entered a New Dimension? Tech. rep. Euro-
barometer Survey 91.5. Brussels: European Parliament, 2019.
[4] Paul Chaisty and StephenWhitefield. “Attitudes towards the environment: are post-Communist societies (still) different?”
In: Environmental Politics 24.4 (2015), pp. 598–616.
[5] Politbarometer. Politbarometer Cumulative Dataset. Tech. rep. ZA7492. Cologne, Germany: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen
E.V., 2019.
[6] YouGov. Top Issues Tracker. Tech. rep. London, UK: YouGov UK, 2019.
[7] Gallup. Most Important Problem. Tech. rep. Washington DC: Gallup Inc., 2019.
[8] Karla Adam. “Why didn’t Greta Thunberg win the Nobel Peace Prize?” en. In: Washington Post (Oct. 2019).
[9] Adam Vaughan. “Right to rebel”. en. In: New Scientist 244.3252 (Oct. 2019), p. 23.
[10] Jennifer Earl, Thomas V. Maher, and Thomas Elliott. “Youth, activism, and social movements”. en. In: Sociology Com-
pass 11.4 (2017), e12465.
[11] John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory”. In: American
Journal of Sociology 82.6 (May 1977), pp. 1212–1241.
[12] Gregor Hagedorn et al. “Concerns of young protesters are justified”. en. In: Science 364.6436 (Apr. 2019), pp. 139–140.
[13] Matthew Taylor. “Trade unions around the world support global climate strike”. en-GB. In: The Guardian (Sept. 2019).
[14] Julia C. Becker et al. “Committed Dis(s)idents: Participation in Radical Collective Action Fosters Disidentification With
the Broader In-Group But Enhances Political Identification”. en. In: Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 37.8
(Aug. 2011), pp. 1104–1116.
[15] S. Nima Orazani and Bernhard Leidner. “The power of nonviolence: Confirming and explaining the success of nonviolent
(rather than violent) political movements”. en. In: European Journal of Social Psychology 49.4 (2019), pp. 688–704.
[16] John W. Kingdon. Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston: Little, Brown, 1995.
[17] Stuart N. Soroka and Christopher Wlezien. Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion and Policy. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
[18] Matthew Lockwood. “Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: exploring the linkages”. In: Environmental
Politics 27.4 (July 2018), pp. 712–732.
[19] Cas Mudde. “The Populist Zeitgeist”. en. In: Government and Opposition 39.4 (2004), pp. 541–563.
[20] Christopher Weible and Paul A. Sabatier. Theories of the Policy Process. 4th. New York: Westview Press, 2017.
[21] Quirin Schiermeier et al. “Scientists worldwide join strikes for climate change”. en. In: Nature 573 (Sept. 2019), pp. 472–
473.
[22] Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2010.
[23] Andrew J. Hoffman and Marc Ventresca. “The Institutional Framing of Policy Debates: Economics Versus the Environ-
ment”. en. In: American Behavioral Scientist 42.8 (May 1999), pp. 1368–1392.
[24] Charles R. Shipan and Craig Volden. “The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion”. en. In: American Journal of Political
Science 52.4 (2008), pp. 840–857.
6
